Moral and angry emotions provoked by informal social control

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Informal social control is the communication of disapproval by one individual to another individual (the perpetrator) who has transgressed a social norm. The present research examined the conditions under which social control provokes moral versus angry emotions in the perpetrator. The roles of perceived deviance and the appraisal of the legitimacy of social control as predictors of these emotions were specifically considered. In two studies, participants imagined themselves in situations in which they engaged in moderately uncivil acts and then received social control (or not). Perpetrators' perception of the deviance of their behaviour (Studies 1 and 2), and their explicit appraisals of the legitimacy of social control were measured (Study 2). Moral and angry emotions were also assessed. Social control intensified moral and particularly angry emotions, compared to situations in which deviant acts were performed, but no social control was received. In addition, perceived deviance as well as the politeness of the social control importantly influenced angry emotions through their effects on appraised legitimacy.

In most Western cultures, witnesses to an act of "incivility"[1]—a counter-normative or deviant behaviour that may or may not also be illegal—sometimes show their disapproval, either directly or indirectly, to the perpetrator of the act. They may, for example, make a negative comment or cast an angry glance at the perpetrator (Chekroun & Brauer, 2004). When

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[1]This should be understood as the transgression of "norms of respect".

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the disapproving person is not a member of a social institution of control such as the church, the police or the military, sociologists and social psychologists term this type of behaviour *informal social control* (Brauer & Chekroun, 2005; Gibbs, 1981a, 1981b; Liska, 1997).

Consistent with recent theories of emotion that hold that emotions have defined social functions and are triggered by specific patterns of appraisal of the environment (e.g., Keltner & Haidt, 1999, 2001; Parkinson, 1996; Scherer, 1982, 1984, 1999; Smith & Ellsworth, 1985; Smith & Kirby, 2001), the receipt of informal social control should lead a perpetrator to experience moral emotions (i.e., embarrassment, shame, and guilt; Tangney, 1991, 1994). However, even seemingly harmless acts of social control may sometimes cause actors to feel anger, rather than guilt or shame, which can lead to aggression (Frijda, 1986; Frijda, Kuipers, & ter Schure, 1989). This phenomenon was dramatically illustrated in a recent event in the United States in which a young man in Oklahoma shot and killed his neighbour and the neighbour's wife, and injured seven others, after the neighbour told him that he was driving too recklessly (i.e., an act of social control).

One possible account of the appearance of angry rather than moral emotions in situations of social control concerns the appraisal of the *legitimacy* of the act of social control itself (Roseman, 1984, 1991; Roseman, Spindel, & Jose, 1990). If the perpetrator of the deviant act perceives the social control as unfair or undeserved he or she is more likely to feel anger and hostility than if he or she perceives it as legitimate. The purpose of the present research was to examine the relation between social control and moral and angry emotional reactions, with an analysis of appraisal of legitimacy as a mediator of anger and hostility. In the first study the perpetrator's perception of the level of deviance of their counter-normative act was used to estimate his or her appraisal of the legitimacy of the social control (i.e., perceptions of low deviance should cause social control to be appraised as undeserved or unfair). Perceived deviance was operationalised as the extent to which the behaviour was counter-normative and uncivil. In the second study, both perceived deviance and legitimacy were measured as predictors of the negative emotions of interest.

Social control and deviance

Social living generally requires the existence of norms for appropriate or civil behaviour (Asch, 1951; Sherif, 1936). Individuals who engage in counter-normative behaviours are often victims of sanctions by other group members, because their behaviours are seen as threatening to the functioning of the group (Schachter, 1951). Thus, deviants have been shown to receive

angry looks or a negative comments (Chekroun & Brauer, 2004), to be given less money than other group members (Dedrick, 1978), to be ignored in group decision-making (Janis, 1982), and even to be excluded from the group (Schachter, 1951). This process of imposing sanctions for deviant behaviour has been termed "social control" (Collins & Frey, 1992; Gibbs, 1981a,b; Liska, 1997).

Consistent with recent work of Brauer and colleagues (e.g., Brauer & Chekroun, 2005; Chekroun & Brauer, 2002), here we define social control as any verbal or nonverbal communication by which individuals show to another person that they disapprove of his or her deviant (counter-normative) behaviour. For example, if an individual cuts in line in front of a number of waiting shoppers in a bakery, one or many of the waiting individuals might frown and shake their heads or make comments about the inappropriateness of the behaviour to the individual directly, or to the other individuals waiting in line. The overall goal of social control is to alter immediate and future behaviour. One of the main mechanisms through which it is assumed to do so is the induction of moral emotions in the deviant (Tangney, 1991).

Moral emotions

Theorists agree that several discrete emotions play a role in regulating moral behaviour (Harré, 1980; Miller, 1992; Sabini & Silver, 1997; Scheff, 1988, 1990; Tangney, 1995a,b, 1999; Wicker, Payne, & Morgan, 1983). Although other negative emotions might be involved in the control of moral behaviour, shame, guilt, embarrassment, and regret have been specifically linked to the breaking of social norms and the receipt of formal and informal social sanctions (Damon, 1988; Deinstbier, 1984; Eisenberg, 2000; Harris, 1989; Lewis, 1993; Shulman & Meckler, 1985; Tangney, 1999). Most phenomenological studies of shame and guilt suggest that these emotions make the deviant feel responsible for his or her actions (Ferguson, Stegge, & Damhuis, 1991; Gehm, & Scherer, 1988; Lindsay-Hartz, 1984; Lindsay-Hartz, de Rivera, & Mascolo, 1995; Niedenthal, Tangney, Gavanski, 1994; Tangney, 1991; Tangney, Miller, Flicker, & Barlow, 1995; Wicker, & al., 1983). Thus, these emotions motivate individuals to make amends, and make them less likely repeat the behaviour in the future.

According to appraisal theorists (e.g., Frijda, 1986; Roseman, 1984, 1991; Scherer, 1999), feelings of shame or guilt arise when an individual assesses that his or her attitude or behaviour is incompatible with his or her ideal self (i.e., internal standards) or with sociocultural norms and values (Lewis, 1993; Scherer, 1988, 2001; Tangney, 1991). Thus, social control should tend to provoke feelings of moral emotions by making discrepancies between

internal standards and behaviour more salient. Furthermore, the more counter-normative the individual perceives his behaviour to be, the more moral emotion should be experienced.

Angry emotions: When social control is illegitimate

However, as illustrated by the behaviour of the driver in Oklahoma, in some instances acts of social control fail to generate the expected emotional reaction and instead elicit anger, hostility, and potentially aggression towards the controller. Studies of appraisal processes in emotion have shown that the emotion triggered in a specific situation or by a specific object, depends on the individual's subjective appraisal of that situation or object (Roseman, 1984; Scherer, 1999; Smith & Ellsworth, 1985; Smith & Kirby, 2001). Receiving public commentary on the unacceptability of a counter-normative behaviour per se is likely to elicit some level of anger itself because the feedback is unexpected and negative. An appraisal dimension that is also likely to influence the emotions experienced upon the receipt of social control is the perceived *legitimacy* of the act of control. When a negative situation is appraised as illegitimate, in the sense of being undeserved or the situation being otherwise unfair, it is typically met with anger and hostility (Avrill, 1982; Haidt, 2003; Mikula, Petri, & Tanzer, 1990; Mikula, Scherer, & Athenstaedt, 1998; Ortony, Clore & Collins 1988; Roseman, 1984), which predispose individuals to acts of aggression (Frijda et al., 1989; Ortony & Turner, 1990).

   Although the legitimacy of an act of social control could be judged as high or low for many idiosyncratic reasons, one factor assumed to have an impact on the perception of the legitimacy of social control was examined in this research. Specifically, we examined the degree to which the act was considered deviant by the perpetrator himself. Deviance was defined specifically for the participants as the extent to which the act ran counter to social norms and was uncivil. The assessment of perceived deviance of an act should be strongly related to (and potentially determinant of) the judged legitimacy of the social control: the more the behaviour is perceived as deviant the more the act of social control will be viewed as legitimate. Thus, when perceived deviance is high, social control should not strongly influence felt anger. However, when perceived deviance is low, then acts of social control will be seen as illegitimate and will strongly affect anger.

The present studies

In the first study reported here, participants were invited to imagine themselves as perpetrators of deviant acts who were confronted (or not) with an act of social control. Participants then rated the emotions they were likely to experience in the situation. The perceived deviance of the act was also assessed. We anticipated that the receipt of social control would cause an increase in the experience of moral emotions compared to the situation in which no control was received, and that there would be an additive effect of deviance such that the more deviant the act was perceived, the more moral emotion would be experienced as well. In contrast, we expected that angry emotions would increase with the receipt of social control, but that this effect of social control on anger would be much less marked when the act itself was perceived as high in deviance. This is because when the act was perceived as low in deviance, the legitimacy of the social control would also be appraised as low (and, therefore, unfair). Put statistically, we predicted a main effect of social control and a main effect of deviance on moral emotions, and a main effect of social control and an interaction between social control and deviance on angry emotions.

The second study was a replication of the first, but we also directly measured appraised legitimacy as a separate predictor of emotional experience. A further extension involved the manipulation of the politeness of the social control message itself.

STUDY 1

Method

Participants.   Three hundred four French undergraduates (247 women and 58 men; mean age $= 19.5$, $SD = 1.45$) at the University of Clermont-Ferrand voluntarily took part in the study. All were first-year students in psychology courses. As all participants were Francophone, this and the second study were conducted in French. Materials are translated where necessary in this report.

Material.   Participants read four scenarios in which they imagined themselves committing moderately deviant (counter-normative) acts. The deviant acts described in the scenarios included a number of behaviours, motivated by a variety of needs and influences that could be easily imagined by the participant population. These were: littering in a park, disrupting traffic, smoking in a closed public place, and cutting in line in a post office

(see Appendix for scenarios).[2] In order to generalise across social contexts, participants read that they were alone when they committed the deviant act in half of the situations, and they read that they were accompanied by a friend in the remaining situations. We had no specific hypotheses concerning the social context.

Four versions of each scenario were constructed in order to fully cross the two factors of social control (absent vs. present) and context (alone vs. with a friend). Participants evaluated one version of the four scenarios, for a total of four scenarios per participant.

Procedure.   After reading each scenario, participants rated on 7-point scales (from 1 = *not at all intense* to 7 = *very intense*) how intensely they anticipated that they would feel each of 13 emotions listed in a single random order. Five items assessed moral emotions (e.g., guilt, embarrassment, shame, humiliation, and regret). Five others assessed emotions related to anger and aggression (e.g., anger, aggressiveness, hostility, indignation, and contempt). We added the terms hostility and aggressiveness because they are common words in the French emotion lexicon for feeling a level of anger that can lead to verbal or physical aggression.[3] To avoid presenting participants with a list that contained only the negative emotional states of interest, three positive emotions were added (e.g., amusement, pride, and joy), which were not of theoretical interest, and did not form an a priori category.

The degree to which the described behaviours were perceived as deviant (by the participant him- or herself) was measured by two items. Participants

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[2] The scenarios varied in whether or not they described legal and counter-normative versus illegal behaviour. For instance, it is against the law to litter in France while it is not against the law to cut in front of someone in line. Since our concern was to select counter-normative scenarios, we conducted a pretest to examine further the nature of the scenarios. In the pretest, university students from the same population as the main studies ($N = 35$) read one of the four scenario (without social control and in the alone social context) and rated the extent to which they thought the act was: (a) counter the norms of French society; (b) against the law in the French system; and also the extent to which (c) one risked receiving a fine for having committed this behaviour. Ratings were made on 7-point scales (from 0 = *not at all* to 6 = *absolutely*). A MANOVA conducted on participants' three ratings revealed no differences between the four scenarios in their perceived counter-normativity, perceived legality, or in the anticipation to be fined. Furthermore, paired *t*-tests comparing perceived deviance and perceived legality for all the behaviours showed that people considered them to deviate more from the social norms ($M = 3.83$, $SD = 1.67$) than the law ($M = 2.28$, $SD = 1.87$), $t(34) = 5.47$, $p < .001$.

[3] Discussions with bilinguals suggests that different forms of the French words for feeling aggressive and being aggressive toward someone are more common and perhaps less strong or at least less unacceptable to use than in the English language. For example, to say that someone "aggressed me" ("m'agresse") is a common way to say that that a person expressed anger overtly.

rated the extent to which they considered each behaviour to be *counter the norms* of society, and the extent to which they considered each behaviour to be *uncivil*, both on 7-point scales (from 1 = *not at all* to 7 = *completely*).

Questionnaires were administered in classroom settings. Participants were encouraged to remain silent during completion of the questionnaire, to answer all the questions and to visually imagine each scenario before answering the questions. Finally, they indicated their sex, their age, their nationality, and their year of study. Questionnaire completion time was about 30 minutes.

Results

Reliability of dependent measures.   Indices of each emotion type showed good reliability: moral emotions, $\alpha = .88$; angry emotions, $\alpha = .86$. A general index of perceived deviance for the four scenarios was computed by averaging the ratings of counter-normativity and incivility. The combined reliability estimate was satisfactory: $\alpha = .69$.

Predicting emotional reactions from social control and social context.   In initial analyses, the emotion indexes were submitted to a 2 (Category of Emotion: moral, angry) $\times$ 2 (Social Control: absent, present) $\times$ 2 (Context: alone, friend) analysis of variance (ANOVA) in which all factors varied within subjects. Corresponding means and standards deviation can be found in Table 1.

As expected, the main effect of social control was significant, $F(1, 303) = 102.34$, $p < .001$, $r^2 = .25$ such that all emotions were more intense when social control was received ($M = 2.93$) than in the absence of social control ($M = 2.44$). A main effect of category of emotion was also observed, $F(1, 303) = 616.66$, $p < .001$, $r^2 = .67$. The transgression of standards elicited more moral than angry emotions. Furthermore, we observed a main effect of context, $F(1, 303) = 4.34$, $p < .038$, $r^2 = .01$, indicating that all emotions were

TABLE 1
Means and standard deviations (in parentheses) for all measures in Study 1

	Category of emotions				
	Moral emotions		*Angry emotions*		
Social context	*No social control*	*Social control*	*No social control*	*Social control*	*Average*
Alone	3.19 (1.62)	3.70 (1.47)	1.74 (0.97))	2.29 (1.10)	2.73 (1.28)
Friend	3.28 (1.60)	3.56 (1.57)	1.53 (0.77)	2.14 (1.11)	2.63 (1.26)
Average	3.24 (1.61)	3.63 (1.52)	1.64 (0.87)	2.21 (1.10)	–

significantly less intense when transgressors were with a friend ($M = 2.64$) than when they were alone ($M = 2.74$).

The results also revealed a significant category of emotion by social control interaction, $F(1, 303) = 7.04$, $p < .008$, $r^2 = .03$, indicating that social control had a stronger effect on angry emotions than on moral emotion. Context did not interact with any of the others factors.

We also conducted separate 2 (Social Control: absent, present) × 2 (Context: alone, friend) ANOVAs for each category of emotion separately. As predicted, there was a significant main effect of social control on moral emotions, $F(1, 303) = 31.95$, $p < .001$, $r^2 = .10$, and a significant main effect of social control on angry emotions, $F(1, 303) = 136.47$, $p < .001$, $r^2 = .31$.

Perceived deviance. As planned, we also examined the effects of perceived deviance as an independent variable. For each category of emotion, we conducted a series of four regression analyses to test for simple slopes of perceived deviance on the intensity of the emotions felt in each of the four scenario conditions[4] (e.g., alone/presence of control social; alone/absence of social control; friend/presence of control social; friend/absence of social control).

Using Fisher's *t*-test for non-independent measurements (Ferguson, 1971), we could then compare the regression coefficients. Figure 1 illustrates the simple regression lines reflecting the relations between perceived deviance and the intensity of felt emotion in the two social contexts for the two conditions of social control.

Results of simple regression analyses revealed an effect of perceived deviance on the intensity of moral emotions for all conditions such that these emotions were more intense when the participants perceived the act as more deviant (for alone/presence of control social condition; alone/absence of social control condition; friend/presence of control social condition; friend/absence of social control condition, respectively: $\beta = .52$, $t = 10.48$; $\beta = .57$, $t = 12.17$; $\beta = .61$, $t = 13.50$; $\beta = .56$, $t = 11.77$; all $ps < .001$, see left panels of Figure 1). Separate comparisons between the regression coefficients for the two levels of social control (present, absent) within each of the social contexts conditions showed that the coefficients did not differ reliably from each other ($ps > .20$). In other words, as expected, social control did not interact with perceived deviance in predicting moral emotion. Rather, in addition to the fact that more moral emotion was experienced when social control was present than absent (as found in the within-participants ANOVA

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[4] The perceived deviance scores were analysed in a 2 (Social Control: absent, present) × 2 (Context: alone, friend) within-subjects ANOVA. Neither of the two main effects nor the interaction was statistically significant ($ps > .50$). This result indicates that it is appropriate to treat perceived deviance as an independent variable.

Figure 1. Simple regression lines reflecting the relations between moral emotions and angry emotions and deviance rating by participants to different social control conditions in case of alone and friend context.

reported above), the more deviant the act was perceived to be, the more moral emotion was felt.

Parallel analyses of angry emotions revealed expected differences in the relationship between perceived deviance and these emotions as a function of social control. As can be seen in the right panels of Figure 1, participants' tendency to experience more angry emotions when social control was present rather than absent decreased as perceived deviance increased. This interpretation is supported by the significant differences observed in separate comparisons between the regression coefficients for the two levels of social control (present, absent) for each of the two social contexts. Both comparisons were significant ($t = 3.30$, $p < .001$, for the alone context; $t = 6.29$, $p > .001$, for the friend context; see right panels of Figure 1), indicating that social control interacted with deviance.

Of additional interest is the fact that, as can also be seen in the right panels of Figure 1, when no social control was received, more anger was experienced as perceived deviance increased ($\beta = .21$, $t = 3.63$, $p > .001$ for the alone condition, and $\beta = .23$, $t = 4.06$, $p < .01$ for the friend condition). Since there was no social control, this effect could not be due to anything

about receiving a sanction, or the legitimacy of that sanction. However, as noted by many emotions theorists, there is a close relationship between anger and moral emotions, particularly the moral emotion of shame. According to recent research in the area of shame and guilt, anger emerges as a part of a system of defence of self (Lewis, 1971; Tangney, Wagner, Fletcher, & Gramzow, 1992; Tangney, Wagner, Hill-Barlow, Marschall, & Gramzow, 1996). Therefore, this finding may indicate that since more moral emotion was experienced as deviance increased, defensive anger may have increased in tandem, largely as a consequence of the experience of moral emotions.

Discussion

The purpose of Study 1 was to examine the emotional reactions of a person who transgresses a social norm and receives social control (versus no feedback). As expected, when individuals committed deviant acts, they felt a mix of moral emotions, and little anger. When the act was met with social control, also as expected, we observed increases in both moral and angry emotions. Furthermore, the more deviant the act was perceived to be, the more moral emotion was felt, and this did not interact with the receipt of social control. We also predicted that perceived deviance would affect the experience of angry emotions in cases in which social control was received such that the less the act was perceived as deviant, the more angry emotions would be experienced. This prediction stemmed from the assumption that social control of perceived low-deviance acts would be appraised as unfair or illegitimate. Some support was found for this prediction such that when deviance was perceived as low, the receipt of social control enhanced feelings of anger, whereas this same effect did not occur when deviance was perceived as high. Such a finding suggests, albeit indirectly, that when deviance was perceived as low, a social control message was appraised as illegitimate or undeserved, and thus provoked anger.

Of course, it must be noted that we used perceived deviance as an indicator of appraised legitimacy of the social control, but did not measure legitimacy itself. Furthermore, and more importantly, we measured the experiences of anger and hostility in general, not specifically toward the social controller. That is, of major concern here is the expression of anger and hostility *at the person who communicates disapproval*. If an individual receives social control, the social control could also in theory make them angry at society, angry at the institution that established the particular rule that was violated, and, as noted, angry at themselves. It would seem that a better test of the present hypotheses would be to assess feelings of anger toward the person who delivers social control rather than the experience of those feelings in general.

STUDY 2

In the second study we pursued the link between perceived legitimacy of social control and angry emotions in the following ways. First, we measured both the perceived deviance of the act of transgression as well as the appraised legitimacy of the social control. Second, in the measures of anger and other hostile emotions, we specifically stated that the angry emotions of interest were those directed at the social controller. Because of these changes, therefore, we dropped the condition in which no social control was received, because in that condition the dependent measures would not make sense. Furthermore, we were specifically interested in the feelings of moral and angry emotions following the receipt of social control and since we had compared situations of no control versus control in the first study, we could now move to a finer analysis of the situation (e.g., social control) of interest.

In order to conduct a more thorough examination of the antecedents of moral and angry emotions, we also manipulated a new factor that could affect emotional reactions to social control. This was the degree of politeness of the social control itself. Politeness could have direct effects on feelings, with polite social control directly enhancing moral emotions and impolite social control directly enhancing angry emotions. The relation of (im)politeness to angry emotions is more clearly theoretically based than the relation to moral emotions. The idea that polite feedback increases moral emotions is more speculative, but considered plausible because polite feedback could make the perpetrator less defensive and more self-reflective, thus making the discrepancy between social norms and his or her behaviour more salient. Importantly, politeness could also have indirect effects on anger because impolite social control could also be appraised as illegitimate, thus also enhancing anger in this way. The factor of social context was dropped in the interest of maintaining a manageable experimental design, and because there were no theoretically interesting effects of this variable observed in the first study.

Based on the above reasoning, and the findings of Study 1, our predictions for the second study were that politeness of social control and perceived deviance would affect moral and angry emotions. The more polite the social control and the more deviant the behaviour, the more people should experience moral emotions and the less they should experience angry emotions. Furthermore, we predicted that these effects would be mediated by perceived legitimacy. Specifically, we expected that politeness of social control and perceived deviance would have a positive effect on perceived legitimacy, and that perceived legitimacy, in turn, would have a positive effect on moral emotions and a negative effect on angry emotions. We used

multiple regression analyses and path analyses to test the hypothesised relationships.

Method

Participants. Two hundred six psychology students at the University of Clermont-Ferrand, France, participated voluntarily in the study. The sample consisted of 191 females and 15 males with a mean age of 22.49 years ($SD =$ 4.6). Participants were randomly assigned to one of the two experimental conditions: impolite social control versus polite social control.

Material. In this study, the same moderately deviant acts as those used in Study 1 were employed. The design was completely between subjects, and participants imagined themselves in only one scenario. This design served to lower the possibility of demand characteristics caused by comparisons among types of scenarios.

Two versions of each scenario were constructed in which a verbal act of social control was presented in a polite or impolite way. In the "polite" version, the social control was both characterised as pleasant and contained opening and closing indicators of politeness (e.g., Excuse-me, . . . please?). In the "impolite" version, the social control was characterised as unpleasant, and the indicators of politeness were not present. An example follows:

> You are strolling alone in a public park. You're holding a used Kleenex in your hand. After a while, you toss the Kleenex on the side of the path. Another stroller sees your action and says to you in a pleasant/unpleasant manner: "Excuse me, but there is a trash can on the corner up there. Could you throw your Kleenex away, please?"

As in Study 1, questionnaires were administered in classroom settings. Questionnaire completion took about 15 minutes and participants were encouraged to remain silent throughout the study, to answer all the questions, and to visually imagine each scenario before answering the questions. Finally, they indicated their sex, their age, their nationality and their level of study.

Procedure. After reading the scenario, participants answered nine questions about the nature of the social control itself. These were listed in a random order. Participants were asked the extent to which they considered the feedback *impolite* (e.g., polite*, sympathetic*, unpleasant, aggressive) and *legitimate* (e.g., legitimate, unfair*, inappropriate*, arbitrary*, and exaggerated*). Items marked with an asterisk were subsequently reversed-coded in the calculation of relevant indices.

Next, participants were asked how intensely they would feel each of 13 emotions listed in a random order. Five items measured the intensity of *moral emotions* (e.g., guilt, embarrassment, shame, humiliation, and regret).

Five others measured the intensity of *angry emotions*[5] (e.g., anger toward the person, aggressiveness toward the person, hostility toward the person, indignation, and contempt). The same positive emotions as those assessed in Study 1 (e.g., amusement, pride, and joy) were again measured, but were not taken into account in the analyses.

Finally, the degree of perceived deviance of the behaviour was measured by the participants' ratings of the extent to which they considered the behaviour to be counter the norms of the society, and the extent to which they considered the behaviour to be uncivil.

All items were measured on a 7-point scales (from $0 = not\ at\ all$ to $6 = extremely$), and were randomised for each category of answers.

Results

Reliability of measures.   The mean of the items within construct category constituted the index of impoliteness, $\alpha = .92$, the index of perceived legitimacy, $\alpha = .81$, the index of moral emotions, $\alpha = .86$, the index of angry emotions, $\alpha = .92$, and finally the index of perceived deviance, $\alpha = .74$.

Manipulation check.   The ANOVA conducted on participants' ratings regarding the impoliteness of social control revealed, as expected, a significant main effect of politeness of social control, $F(1, 205) = 36.95$, $p < .001$. Participants in the "impolite social control" condition evaluated social control as more impolite ($M = 4.6$) than those in the "polite social control" condition ($M = 1.7$).

Preliminary analyses.   To verify our assumption that politeness of social control did not interact with perceived deviance, we estimated a multiple regression model in which we regressed perceived legitimacy on perceived deviance (in mean deviation form), politeness of social control (coded as -1 and $+1$), and the product of these two variables. The results revealed a statistically significant main effect of politeness of social control, $\beta = -.39$, $t = 2.58$, $p < .02$, indicating that participants who were the target of polite social control judged this act as more legitimate than those who were the target of impolite social control. The expected main effect of deviance was also significant, $\beta = .37$, $t = 6.13$, $p < .01$. The more the participants

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[5] The ambiguity remaining in the questionnaire concerning the target of angry emotions (e.g., self-directed hostility vs. hostility directed toward others) allows us to envisage a possible dissociation in the hostility responses anticipated by the socially controlled participants, which may generate a difference in the intensity of the emotional reactions experienced. Consequently, this dissociation was controlled by the specification of the target of angry emotions when it was necessary.

evaluated their behaviour as deviant, the more they judged the act of social control legitimate. However, no significant interaction was observed, $t < 1$. We estimated two additional regression models with the same independent variables but with moral emotions and angry emotions as the dependent variables.

Regarding moral emotions, no main effect of politeness was found ($p > .70$). The main effect of perceived deviance was statistically significant ($p < .001$), but there was no significant interaction, $t < 1$. For angry emotions, the main effects of politeness of social control and perceived deviance were significant ($ps < .05$) but the interaction between the two variables was not ($p > .60$).

Bivariate correlation analyses revealed that there was a marginal positive relationship between perceived legitimacy and the extent to which participants reported experiencing moral emotions, $r = .13$, $p < .06$, and a strong negative relationship between perceived legitimacy and the extent to which they reported feeling angry emotions, $r = -.62$, $p < .001$ (see Table 2 for the bivariate correlations among variables).

Path analyses.   Based on our theoretical predictions, we specified a path analysis model with politeness of social control and perceived deviance as exogenous variables and perceived legitimacy, moral emotions, and angry emotions as endogenous variables. Appraised legitimacy was assumed to be affected by politeness of social control and perceived deviance, and to have a causal effect on moral and angry emotions. We specified two additional paths. The first path tested the causal effect from politeness of social control to angry emotions. When people are the target of impolite social control they will feel angry, but it is unreasonable to assume that all of this effect is mediated by perceived illegitimacy of the social control behaviour. People may also feel angry simply because negative feedback is aversive. A second path tested the effect of perceived deviance on moral emotions. We showed in Study 1 that people experience moral emotions when they engage in counter-normative behaviours, independent of whether they are subsequently the target of social control or not. As such, it is reasonable to assume that only part of the effect of perceived deviance on moral emotions is mediated by perceived legitimacy of social control.

The path analysis model with six causal paths (and one unspecified relationship between the exogenous variables) was analysed with EQS (Version 5.6; Bentler, 1993), under Maximum Likelihood (ML) estimation. The χ^2 had a value of 3.05 ($df = 3$) and was not statistically significant ($p = .38$), indicating satisfactory fit. The other fit indices also suggested that the model was highly compatible with the observed relationships, NFI $= .99$, GFI $= .99$, RMSEA $= .01$. The model with its standardised path coefficients is shown in Figure 2. All paths were statistically significant,

TABLE 2
Means, standard deviations (in parentheses), and intercorrelations, for nature of social control, deviance, legitimacy, moral emotions and angry emotions

	Descriptive statistics			Correlations			
	Impoliteness of social control	Politeness of social control	Average	Politeness	Deviance	Legitimacy	Moral emotions
Deviance	3.77 (1.57)	3.64 (1.56)	3.70 (1.57)	.42			
Legitimacy	5.13 (0.95)	5.98 (1.04)	5.55 (0.99)	.39*	.36*		
Moral emotions	3.31 (1.42)	3.28 (1.57)	3.30 (1.50)	.11	.50*	.13†	
Angry emotions	2.04 (1.32)	1.10 (1.16)	1.57 (1.24)	.38*	−.14*	.62*	.02

Note: *$p < .05$; $^{\dagger}p < .10$, 2-tailed testing.

except the path from perceived legitimacy to moral emotions. We therefore decided to estimate another model that was identical to the one described above, but for which no path from perceived legitimacy to moral emotions was specified. The χ^2-value ($df = 4$) for the respecified model was 3.76, $p = .44$. The other fit indices revealed again an excellent fit of the model, NFI = .98, GFI = .99, RMSEA < .001. The path coefficient of the five causal paths remained virtually unchanged compared to the previous model. As can be seen, all estimated paths were statistically significant. The more polite the social control and the more deviant the counter-normative


Figure 2. Model of emotional reactions to informal social control.

behaviour the more participants reported experiencing moral emotions and the less they reported feeling angry emotions. These relationships were partially mediated by perceived legitimacy, at least in the case of angry emotions.

Discussion

The predictions regarding experiences of anger were largely supported in this study. When social control was delivered in an impolite way, it tended to directly induce the experience of angry emotions. In addition, impolite social control was, as expected, viewed as illegitimate. In turn, the perception of illegitimacy caused the transgressor to feel more angry emotions. Furthermore, when transgressors viewed their behaviour as low in deviance, they also perceived the social control as illegitimate, and experienced more anger. Experiences of moral emotions were not accounted for in a complementary way. Our best-fitting model showed that these emotions were primarily induced by the perpetrator's perception of the deviance of his or her act. The more the act was seen as deviant, the more moral emotions were experienced.

GENERAL DISCUSSION

The purpose of this research was to examine the impact of social control on the moral and angry emotions experienced by a perpetrator of a deviant act. Although the concept of incivility has become a concern in many Western countries, it is not at all clear how individuals can directly request that other members of their society behave in a civil manner, without fear of retribution or aggression. This is a contentious issue in any event as most Western countries are largely "individualistic" in mentality. In individualist countries, the concept of social control might seem at first pass to be undesirable. On the other hand, requiring that the State, as just one option, intervene in order to maintain civility is also highly undesirable. Thus, understanding how to best communicate civic concern would appear to be an issue of vital importance.

The findings of the present studies, consistent with our hypotheses and other work on the transgression of social norms (e.g., Barrett 1995; Damon, 1988; Deinstbier, 1984; Eisenberg, 2000; Harris, 1989; Lewis, 1993; Shulman & Meckler, 1985; Tangney, 1999), demonstrated that individuals feel moral emotions in situations in which they engage in minor transgressions, and also that receiving social control enhances the experience of such emotions. In addition, both studies showed that the receipt of social control also tends to provoke some degree of angry emotion. As illustrated clearly in Study 2, one of the most important predictors of anger felt toward an individual who

delivers social control is the perception that the message of control is not legitimate. We found that perceived deviance as well as the politeness of the social control influenced angry emotions through their effects on appraised legitimacy. In addition, politeness had direct effects on angry emotions such that the less polite the communication, the more angry emotions were provoked.

Interestingly, while the first study showed that the receipt of social control enhances the experience of moral emotions (relative to the absence of social control), the second study showed that politeness of social control had neither direct nor indirect effects on the experience of moral emotions. We had thought that if a controller delivered polite social control that this might both directly and indirectly pique deeper feelings of shame and guilt, but this was not the case. One interpretation of this finding is that moral emotions, already present when the deviant act is committed, cause a self-focus of attention that make the degree of politeness of the social control less noticeable (e.g., Tangney, 1999). Another possibility is that the politeness of social control affects experiences of other positive emotions, such as sympathy or concern, but not moral emotions.

While the findings of the two studies were largely consistent, the second study provided a clearer account of the experience of the elicitation of angry emotions in situations in which a transgression occurs and social control is received. Since we were most interested in hostility directed toward the person who delivers the social control, we feel that the second study's analysis of the predictors of angry emotions is probably the most valid.

There are a few limitations of the present studies that could be evaluated or improved upon in future research. First, both studies relied on scenario methodology. The problem here is that participants may have relied on their naïve theories of emotions and their beliefs about emotion norms in order to complete our questionnaires. Naïve theories may differ in some ways from the behaviour that would be seen in real-life situations. And emotion norms may not always be adhered to in stressful situations. There are two responses to such an objection, however. One is that the complex situation of social control is one that has to be appraised in any event. Social control is not a prepared stimulus that inevitably elicits a certain emotion. We are quite comfortable with the assumption that the appraisals that typically determine the emotions experienced when confronted with social control in real life are those that our participants used when imagining themselves as a recipient of social control. A second response to the objection is that the application of emotion norms in responding to our questionnaire would have resulted in the report of almost no anger, or no variability in anger. And anger would probably not have been mediated by perceptions of legitimacy in sensible ways. Our

findings reflect sensible appraisal processes, but not the strict adherence to a norm (especially applied to women) not to express anger.

Indeed, the methodology, as employed in this research, had a number of positive features. First, we tried to develop believable stories. Informal conversations with the participants, and pilot testing, revealed that individuals from the present population had no trouble imagining such situations. Moreover, we used a number of different easily imaginable scenarios in order to be able to generalise the findings. We also note that the levels of self-reported emotions were rather high, particularly as concerns the moral emotions. Thus, we appear to have had success in generating emotion-provoking scenarios. It would seem very difficult to try to assess individuals' emotions just after having received social control. However, we could imagine laboratory inductions of norm transgressions, and future research will certainly pursue such a methodology. Finally, we did manipulate the scenario within- (Study 1) and between- (Study 2) subjects. Thus, in the second study we eliminated possible influences of the ability to compare contents of the different scenario on the emotion measures, and therefore a degree of experimental demand.

A second limitation of the studies involves the range of emotions examined. Although we included several positive emotions in our measures in order to distract from the purpose of the research, we measured only the sets of emotions of theoretical interest (i.e., moral and angry emotions). Future research could also explore the presence of other reactions to social control such as anxiety or sadness. The inclusion of additional categories of emotion will allow more precise conclusions to be drawn about the specificity of reactions to social control under different types of situations.

In conclusion, the present work represents a first investigation of the factors that lead individuals to experience moral and angry emotions when they receive disapproving reactions to their counter-normative behaviour. Appraisal theory also hints at other ways to understand the variability in emotions that result from the receipt of social control. Specifically, the attributions for one's own counter-normative behaviour (i.e., as determined by external or internal factors), should play an important role in the emotions that result from being socially controlled because these attributions determine the extent to which an individual feels responsible for the behaviour in the first place. An investigation of the role of attribution in the determination of moral and angry emotions is currently on going in the present laboratory.

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APPENDIX

Disrupting traffic. You are driving back from having done some shopping. In order to unload the car you decide to stop the car in the street, right in front of the door to your place. In so doing, you disrupt traffic such that cars can only pass you with great difficulty. (*Social control*: Suddenly another car arrives and the driver, losing patience, honks and says, "Could you park elsewhere? I can't get by.")

Littering in a park.   You are taking a walk in a heavily frequented public garden, holding a used Kleenex in your hand. At one point, you toss the Kleenex on the path in order to dispose of it. (*Control social*: A passer-by turns to you and says, "Could you throw that in a trash can?")

Smoking in a public place.   You are sitting on a bench in a shopping mall, waiting to meet someone. Despite the fact that it is prohibited, you light a cigarette and wait for the person to arrive. (*Social control*: A person sitting next you turns to you and says, "Excuse me, could you put out your cigarette? Smoking isn't allowed here, and the smoke bothers me.")

Cutting in line in a post office.   You have to go to the post office in order to send a package of some importance. The line at the post office is long and you don't want to wait. You notice that there is a counter at the back that is difficult to see, and where no one is being waited on. You decide to cut in front of the others in front of you, and go directly to the open counter. (*Social control*: The people waiting in line notice that you are cutting in front, and one of them turns to you and says, "Excuse me, but the end of the line is over there.")